PGPR
Made a discovery that will revolutionise my university experience. And that is, Prince George's Park Residences offers a relatively tranquil environment to lunch and rest in. This is very important because I cannot stand the crowds that seem to be everywhere, everytime. Time is the only restraining factor, but I reckon one hour is enough to travel, have a meal there, and soak in a bit of the peaceful ambience; for longer breaks one can nap in their virtually empty air-conditioned rooms.
This reminds me of my getaways in junior college, where even an half-hour break sufficiently warrants me to get out of school and eat at a nearby coffee shop. I especially love those mornings where I sit and have a brunch with some coffee at 9 or 10am while everyone else is at school enjoying themselves.
I love the CORS system that NUS uses to allocate modules to students, though there is a tiny flaw in the system. Hence the following email to them.
Hello CORS team,
I would like to highlight an issue that I think is not a very good feature of the CORS system. Currently, students receive no penalties when they place bid points on any modules. If I have 500 points left to spend after having bid for 4 modules, there is really no incentive to consider and place a reasonable bid for that last module. This is because there are no penalties for spending more bid points than is necessary to get the bid, even when demand exceeds supply: the system will simply return all excess bid points. Hence in this scenario I would rationally just dump 500 points on the module - there is little harm anyway. The only consideration I have to bear is that I may potentially lose all 500 points if the minimum bid goes that high, but as far as bidding points are concerned, there are no issues.
This is a problem because the lack of penalties leads to a situation in which a student's demand for the module is not accurately reflected. It is, instead, more a reflection of how many points a student has rather than a reflection of perceived value of the module. This effectively leads to a distortion of the market system that is the linchpin of the allocation process. If all students think the same way they would all dump X points on the last module, where X is all the points they have left in the account. This potentially leads to an inflation of bid points needed to secure the module, and the inflated price of the module will not be in line with the equilibrium price.
Furthermore, this feature does not encourage much thinking when placing bids, and simply provides a risk-free environment where risk is not in line with reward. This is not reflective of a real market system. In any case, it is probably true that in all areas of society and in all walks of life, risk comes with reward. I do not see why the CORS system, though it may be a simulated one, should be an exception in this regard.
Yours for the most part,
An undergraduate.
This reminds me of my getaways in junior college, where even an half-hour break sufficiently warrants me to get out of school and eat at a nearby coffee shop. I especially love those mornings where I sit and have a brunch with some coffee at 9 or 10am while everyone else is at school enjoying themselves.
I love the CORS system that NUS uses to allocate modules to students, though there is a tiny flaw in the system. Hence the following email to them.
Hello CORS team,
I would like to highlight an issue that I think is not a very good feature of the CORS system. Currently, students receive no penalties when they place bid points on any modules. If I have 500 points left to spend after having bid for 4 modules, there is really no incentive to consider and place a reasonable bid for that last module. This is because there are no penalties for spending more bid points than is necessary to get the bid, even when demand exceeds supply: the system will simply return all excess bid points. Hence in this scenario I would rationally just dump 500 points on the module - there is little harm anyway. The only consideration I have to bear is that I may potentially lose all 500 points if the minimum bid goes that high, but as far as bidding points are concerned, there are no issues.
This is a problem because the lack of penalties leads to a situation in which a student's demand for the module is not accurately reflected. It is, instead, more a reflection of how many points a student has rather than a reflection of perceived value of the module. This effectively leads to a distortion of the market system that is the linchpin of the allocation process. If all students think the same way they would all dump X points on the last module, where X is all the points they have left in the account. This potentially leads to an inflation of bid points needed to secure the module, and the inflated price of the module will not be in line with the equilibrium price.
Furthermore, this feature does not encourage much thinking when placing bids, and simply provides a risk-free environment where risk is not in line with reward. This is not reflective of a real market system. In any case, it is probably true that in all areas of society and in all walks of life, risk comes with reward. I do not see why the CORS system, though it may be a simulated one, should be an exception in this regard.
Yours for the most part,
An undergraduate.
2 Comments:
market or perceived value is based on the demand and supply at that point of time....the penalty is that you will delay your module completion.
ll
So you really wrote an email. *applaud*
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